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ABSTRACT 
 
Infrastructure can be unreliable and administration subject to corruption in Asia’s rapidly emerging 
economies. This context presented Singapore with unique opportunities to export its ‘positive 
reputation’ to locations where these attributes are less certain, through the provision of superior 
infrastructure, the ability to negotiate investment concessions and, where existing, through the 
links to influential business groups in the investment location. This strategic initiative is premised 
on the perception that Singapore’s good relations with multinationals, as well as “connections” 
with Asian business networks, will give the industrial-township projects a marketing advantage. 
To complement the extensive literature on Singapore’s flagship projects in Indonesia and China, this 
paper takes a closer look at Singapore’s lesser-known project1 in India. Case studies of selected 
companies are also presented. It finds that progress in this privileged foreign investment zone 
remains stymied by particular dependencies and challenges. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Singapore’s regionalization strategy comprised state-led infrastructure projects, and a range of 
incentives and regulatory innovations designed to assist private companies and individuals to 
move overseas2. The program involved the establishment of industrial townships to create a 
‘Singapore-styled’ business environment for local and Singapore-based MNCs to expand 
regionally. The Singapore government, in this instance, takes the initiative to develop regional 
sites as locations to access resources and markets.  
 
The paper takes up the discussion on Singapore’s lesser-known industrial-township project in 
India. The discussion commences with further background to the regionalization program, 
followed by an account of the origins and progress of the case study park. This flagship project is 
then evaluated in terms of the progress in attracting investment, the contributions to the strategic 
objectives associated with the park, as well as to Singapore’s broader regionalization initiative. 
The final part of the paper considers the implications of these experiences for Singapore’s 
regionalization program, as well as the city-state’s ability to export its efficiency in industrial park 
development and management outside its borders. 
 
 
‘SINGAPORE INC’ 
 
The mid-1960s saw the beginnings of the Singapore government’s aggressive approach to woo 
foreign MNCs to fuel the city-state’s economic development (Chia, 1986; Pang, 1987). By the 
early 1980s, rising business costs rendered it an imperative for Singapore to shift from labor-
intensive activities towards higher value-added ones (Lim, 1984). Singapore’s economic planners 
sought to expand the island's investment horizons through an overseas direct investment 
program launched in 1988. The main ideas were set out in the policy document, Gearing Up for an 
Enhanced Role in the Global Economy (Singapore Economic Development Board (SEDB), 1988). 
The 1990 Global Strategies Conference added new dimensions to these deliberations (SEDB, 
1990). This initiative sought to accelerate access to new technology, or foreign markets, by 
supporting Singapore companies to form joint ventures with overseas companies in Europe and 
North America (Caplen & Ng, 1990; Wong & Ng, 1991; Hughes, 1993; Murray & Pereira, 1995). 
                                                          
1
 This paper and three accompanying studies are funded by the Wharton-SMU Research Centre, Singapore Management 
University. 
2
 A summary of the regionalization incentive schemes may be gleaned from the Singapore Investment News, 
Regionalization Supplement, May 1993 (SEDB, 1993c). 
Most of these investments proved unsuccessful, resulting in enormous losses by the early 1990s 
(Balakrishnan, 1991; Kanai, 1993; Regnier, 1993). A new phase in the internationalization 
strategy re-focused on expansion within Asia. The change from internationalization (or, in local 
parlance, outer globalization) to regionalization (inner globalization) was rationalised by the 
liberalisation of foreign investment controls occurring at the time in countries like Indonesia, China 
and Vietnam, and the high growth rates these economies were achieving (Mahizhnan, 1994; 
Kwok, 1995; Pang, 1995; Perry, 1995; Tan, 1995; Kraar, 1996). The strategic repositioning was 
discussed at the 1993 Regionalization Forum, and encapsulated in the policy document, 
Singapore Unlimited (SEDB, 1993a; 1993b; 1995a; 1995b). This point was amplified by the 
Committee to Promote Enterprise Overseas (Singapore Ministry of Finance, 1993: 13): 
 
“… Other countries like South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong have 
invested overseas in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and China 
in a big way in the last 4-5 years. These investments will give their GNP 
an added boost. Mature economies like those of the US, Japan, France 
and Switzerland have this external dimension which broadens their 
domestic operations and help upgrade their economy. For the same 
reasons, we must grow an external wing to our economy.” 
 
Private sector reluctance3 in regionalizing was the Government’s raison d’être that Singapore’s 
government linked companies (GLCs) should lead the regionalization drive. The Government’s 
role in the township developments was three-pronged. First, senior politicians and civil servants 
negotiated4 the institutional framework for the project, which typically involved garnering special 
investment conditions in the host location. Second, Singapore government agencies and GLCs 
were the prime investors in the infrastructure and real estate development, usually via a 
‘government-selected’ consortium. The prominence of government agencies and government-
linked companies reflected the scale and long pay-back periods for infrastructure, which may 
make the investment unattractive to private companies alone. The third role played by the state 
was in the marketing and promotion of the parks: 
 
 “Companies can reduce their risks when venturing into Asia by linking 
up with local partners, and Singapore can help facilitate this process by 
acting as a “Partnership Centre” to bring together strategic alliances for 
companies to invest in third countries in the region. … [We] can provide 
foreign companies with a convenient foothold through the industrial 
parks that are being built and managed by Singapore in China, India, 
Indonesia and Vietnam.”     
             - Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
                                 (Cited in Asian Review, 1996, p.VII) 
  
 
INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY PARK LIMITED (ITPL) 
 
The industrial-township projects in Indonesia, China and Vietnam have had a political objective to 
demonstrate the strength of the ‘Singapore development model’ and its transferability to other 
Asian environments. ITPL has narrower objectives, based on the perception that Singapore 
                                                          
3
 For a scholarly discussion on the political economy of Singapore’s development strategy, see Rodan (1989), Regnier 
(1991), Ng, et al. (1992); Huff (1995) and Blomqvist (2001). There is also an extensive political-economy literature on 
Singapore’s regionalization program, succinctly summarized in Yeung (1998). The principles of government involvement 
are rationalized in the 1993 Report of the Committee to Promote Enterprise Overseas. 
 
4
 The stress on exploiting personal ties accords with business practice preferred by the linked communities of ‘overseas 
Chinese’ (Redding, 1990, Brown, 1998; Lehman, 1998), the ‘bamboo network’ which Singapore made use of in its 
industrial parks in Indonesia (Sato, 1993; Hill, 1996) and China (Cartier, 1995; Yeung, 1997). Personal ties between 
Chairman, SEDB, and Ratan Tata (of the Tata Group) reportedly facilitated the move into India (Asian Review, 1996). 
 
agencies have an advantage in infrastructural development in India. ITPL was instigated as a real 
estate development.  
 
ITPL, located 18km away from Bangalore in India’s Silicon Valley5, was launched in 1994, as a 
forerunner for a new generation of Singapore-developed industrial parks in India. The idea was 
mooted by Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and India’s Premier, P.V. Narasimha Rao, 
in 1992. Construction commenced in September 1994, and the park was officially inaugurated in 
2000.The partners in the ITPL project are a Singapore consortium of companies6 led by 
Ascendas International, the Tata Group (India’s largest business conglomerate) and the 
Karnataka state government in a 40-40-20 arrangement. The Karnataka state government has 
since reduced its stake to 6 percent, while the Singapore consortium and the Tata Group have 
increased their respective stakes to 47 percent each. 
ITPL was marketed as an environment that “cuts through the red tape and bottlenecks that are a 
part of India’s infrastructure and operating environment” (The Straits Times, August 8, 1999). 
ITPL was slated to provide total business space solutions to multinationals and other 
conglomerates, within a state-of-the-art technology park. The park’s development consists of 2 
phases. Phase 1, which includes the Discoverer, Creator and Innovator blocks, with built-up 
office, production and retail space, adopts the Singapore-styled, integrated ‘work, live and play’ 
concept. ITPL’s futuristic design comes complete with numerous amenities, facilities and support 
services, and includes residential apartments and penthouses. More distinctively, ITPL 
guarantees uninterrupted power supply and telecommunication facilities, immediate-occupancy 
business incubator space, and the formulaic ‘one-stop’ service. Phase 2, comprising the Explorer 
building, a replica of the Innovator, Built-To-Suit (BTS) facilities, is due for completion in early 
2004. This phase will add a total area of 350,000 square feet to ITPL’s current built-up area of 1.6 
million square feet. ITPL also houses the Indian Institute of Information Technology, which 
provides professional and skilled manpower for the park’s tenants. 
ITPL’s first development phase is fully committed. The earliest clients included SAP Labs, First 
Ring and 24/7. The first 39 tenants started their operations in 1999, and created some 2000 jobs. 
To-date, there are 100 confirmed tenants, of which 93 are operational with 8500 employees 
(Table 1).  
Table 1: International Technology Park Limited 
Operational Statistics (as at January 2003) 
 
General Information 
              
              Scale of Development  
              Developed Area           
Total Investment Value 
Confirmed Tenants 
Operating Tenants 
Area Taken Up 
Park Population 
 
About 70 acres 
1.6 million sq ft 
SG$200 Million 
100 
 93 
1.4 million sq ft. 
8,500 
 
 
Source: ITPL, Bangalore 
                                                          
5
 Indian universities reportedly graduate about 20,000 to 30,000 software engineers every year, and Bangalore has been 
a ‘hunting ground’ for Singapore companies and Singapore-based multinationals seeking low-cost IT specialists. 
 
6
 The Singapore consortium, Information Technology Park Investments Pte Ltd,  includes RSP Architects, Planners and 
Engineers, L&M Properties, Sembawang Industrial, Technology Parks (a Jurong Town Corporation subsidiary) and 
Parameswara Holdings (the investment arm of the Singapore Indian Chamber of Commerce). 
 
More than half the tenants are wholly or partially foreign-owned firms, and more than 70 percent 
are in software development, integrated circuit design, research and development and precision 
technology (Tables 2 & 3). ITPL’s tenants include global players like AT&T, IBM, Motorola, Sony, 
Texas Instruments, Citicorp and Thomas Cook. 
   
Table 2: ITPL – Tenant Profile by Country of Origin (January 2003) 
 
Country Number 
 
Country Number 
PercentaUS 42 Europe 16 
India 36 Asia 6 
    
Source: ITPL, Bangalore 
 
Table 3: ITPL – Tenant Profile by Sector (January 2003) 
Industry Number Industry Number 
Software Development  49 IC Design  3 
BPO/ITES 24 R&D 
R&D 
1 
Biotech/Bio-Informatics 
Biotech/Bioinformatics 
3 Educational Institutions 2 
Manufacturing  10 Others 8 
 
 Source: ITPL, Bangalore 
 
Operating profits have been registered, and ITPL is projected to break even within the next 4 
years.     
ITPL’s competitive advantages as an investment location have been discussed. However, the 
update has relied primarily on secondary data from official publications, press reports, etc. This 
stock-take cannot adequately reflect the differential impact of various pull factors on the 
investment decision of different types of investors (e.g. local or foreign), or the differential impact 
of different types of constraints on the operations of firms with different characteristics (e.g. 
ownership type, market orientation, establishment size). To obtain firm-level data, on-site surveys 
and interviews were conducted in December 2002 and May 2003. The case studies are 
presented in this paper, while an accompanying paper (Yeoh, Ahluwalia & Wong, forthcoming) 
follows through with the quantitative aspects of this project. The next section presents case 
studies of four multinational companies in ITPL. 
 
 
CASE STUDIES 
 
The companies were selected to reflect ITPL’s diversity, and for their considerable presence in 
the park. The semi-structured interviews were designed to gather information on the push-pull 
factors that influenced the firms’ decision to locate in ITPL. Other questions pertaining to the 
companies’ views on the facilities and services in the park were culled from the open-ended 
questions. The characteristics of the firms are summarised in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4: Summary Information on Case Study Firms 
 
Company Country Industry Employee Strength in ITPL 
Space Occupancy 
(square feet) 
A Germany Inter-Enterprise Software 500 100,000 
B U.S.A Business Process Outsourcing 800 60,000 
C U.S.A Business Process Outsourcing 12,000 42,000 
D U.K. Travel and Financial Services 5 - 
 
In addition to the push-pull factors, the case studies pave the way for a discussion on how 
Singapore has managed to develop ITPL as a centre for high value added activities. Specifically, 
the interviews sought to glean empirical insights on how ITPL strives to establish a strategic fit 
between the value-added chain of the firms, and the comparative advantages of a region.  
Case A - Inter-Enterprise Software 
 
Company A is a wholly owned subsidiary of an international software giant. Its German parent is 
recognized as the world leader in providing collaborative business solutions for all types of 
industries and major markets, and, enjoys the position of being the world’s largest inter-enterprise 
software company, and the world’s third largest independent software supplier overall. The parent 
company also employs 28,800 people in over 50 countries. 
 
Company A was initially a German IT company, operating in the Koramangala district in the city 
of Bangalore. It was taken over by the above-mentioned parent company in 1998, a move that 
was accompanied by a shift into ITPL. With actual operations within ITPL beginning only in 1997, 
the company’s establishment in 1998 made it one of the first occupiers. It also boasts of being the 
park’s largest tenant, in terms of space occupancy, covering about 100,000 square feet (9,000 
square metres). 
 
The company initially had a choice of relocating itself at ITPL or at other city locations, which 
offered one-fourth the rent. However, the company chose ITPL, despite its higher rents, largely 
due to the following critical advantages that ITPL provided: uninterrupted power supply, state-of 
the-art infrastructure, ease and speed of setting up shop, and excellent communication channels. 
In justifying the company’s relocation into ITPL, a company official had this to say: “For any 
company, ITPL provides excellent operating facilities, which brings about an increase in revenue. 
This increase in revenue is larger than the increase in costs (in terms of rent)”. The company’s 
primary operation within the park is confined to software development, and is described as a 
“100% export unit”. All its exports go to Germany. 
 
The company, after having completed fours years in the park, has decided to move out.  The 
principal reason given for this is the rapid growth of the firm. In the 4 years since its inception it 
has grown from a little over 70 employees to 500 employees today. Space constraints within the 
park have forced the company to look at other locations. ITPL has been unable to cater to the 
growing and irregular needs of the company, being a park suited for small and medium 
enterprises. As a fast expanding company, the company no longer views ITPL’s costly rents as 
one that can be justified. Instead, the company has moved into an expansive new campus, 15 
acres in area, where it can enjoy economies of scale. Furthermore, the company views such a 
shift as an opportunity to establish its own identity, which it had not fully experienced in a mutli-
tenanted place like ITPL. However, given ITPL’s ‘distinct’ advantages, the company has not fully 
relocated. Instead it continues to retain office space in the park’s new BTS (Built-To-Suit) 
facilities. 
 
Case B - Business Process Outsourcing 
 
Company B is an American based firm undertaking e-services. It is known to provide the industry 
standard in customer support services and solutions to Global 500 companies. It was founded by 
an experienced management team with proven expertise in delivering large-scale, mission-critical 
customer support programs, with its corporate headquarters in Los Gatos, California, and 
operations at the ITPL, Bangalore. 
 
ITPL, with its facilities best suited for small and medium enterprises engaged largely in R&D and 
in the service industry, has become a breeding ground, of sorts, for companies involved in 
Business Process Outsourcing (BPO). Located at the ‘Creator’ building of ITPL, company B is 
one of many such companies. Established in the park in April 2000, the company has over 800 
employees, occupying 60,000 square feet. 
 
Its key operations in the park include call centres, real-time customer service management and 
technical support to foreign firms. In fact, the facility in ITPL is the largest call centre in the state 
of Karnataka. Catering to customers as big as Alta Vista, the company has conducted successful 
programs such as outbound telemarketing, inbound phone customer service, inbound phone 
technical service, with service areas spanning countries worldwide, particularly, U.S and Europe. 
 
Involved in email and telephone-based customer services targeted at customers all round the 
world, the company, like all others concerned with BPO operations, requires a facility that will 
provide the necessary round-the-clock resources. ITPL successfully makes available the same. 
The regular power supply, the 24-hour speedy connectivity and the plug and play services of 
ITPL have proven to be the distinguishing factors in luring the company. An added advantage is 
seen in the fact that the city of Bangalore abounds with excellent schools and universities. This 
coupled with the high standard of education, serves as a continuous source of skilled 
employment for the call centres located in the park. The company sees this pool of potential 
employees as an added advantage in carrying out its operations in ITPL. 
 
Case C - Business Process Outsourcing 
 
Company C is a wholly American owned firm, with its parent company being considered a 
frontrunner in integrating the expanding capabilities of information technology, 
telecommunications and the internet. The parent company has its headquarters in Virginia, 
U.S.A. Its services include voice-based services, internet services, back-office functions, and 
interactive teleservices.  
 
Company C, located in ITPL, was incorporated in May 1999 as a 100% subsidiary. Its facility 
within the park spreads over 42,000 square feet and employs 12,000 employees. The company’s 
functions within the park largely focus on Business Process Outsourcing, which include both 
inbound and outbound customer care. 
 
As in the case of other companies in the same industry, Company C, too, cites the permanent 
power supply, 24-hour connectivity and supporting infrastructure as the vital factors that prompted 
it to situate in the park. The company also employs a sizeable portion of the IT graduates that 
Bangalore churns out every year. 
 
In addition to the above, according to a company official, the firm perceives ITPL’s excellent and 
professional support services and maintenance programs as a huge advantage that gives it an 
added edge over its peers that are located elsewhere. Such benefits have been the direct result 
of the Singaporean styled management. However, the company has expressed reservation over 
the numerous other call centres making their way into ITPL to make use of the same advantages, 
which escalates into other problems such as heightened competition, further sharing of resources 
and the “the pool of entry level people getting smaller”. 
 
Case D – Travel and Financial Services 
 
Company D is one of the world's leading international travel and financial services groups and 
serves over 20 million customers a year. It provides services at 4,500 locations in more than 100 
countries and employs over 20,000 people. 
 
Establishing itself in India as early as in 1881, today, the company’s Indian subsidiary has a 
network of 54 locations in 16 cities across India and is the largest travel and financial services 
group in the country. Foreign exchange, corporate travel, leisure holidays, travel insurance and 
credit cards form the core activities of the company. 
 
Company D is one of the very few companies that was approached by the ITPL management 
itself to set up shop at the park. On the management’s behest, the company acquired an office 
within the park’s premises largely to provide money-changing activity. Its core operations within 
the park, therefore, include ticketing and foreign exchange services. 
 
Compared to some of the other tenants, company D seems a smaller entity with only 5 
employees for its office in the park. However, it has managed to secure a large customer base 
largely due to the fact that it is the only tenant providing such services within the park. Moreover, 
the company also caters to an increasing number of firms outside the park who find it convenient 
to visit its office in the park, which is in close proximity, instead of approaching its other branches 
placed in the city-centre. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The tenants at ITPL pose a stark contrast to those in the other Singapore-styled industrial parks 
in Indonesia, Vietnam and China, which have managed to attract a significant majority of their 
tenants on the basis of abundant low-cost, low-skilled labour. The scenario in ITPL is decidedly 
different. Our study suggests that the same advantage of plentiful and cost-effective labour has 
not been the sole influencing factor in attracting firms to the park. The primary reason, which has 
encouraged firms to settle in the park, has been that of excellent infrastructural facilities and the 
Singapore-styled management characterized by its quintessential efficiency. Anecdotal evidence 
from our on-site interviews suggests that international IT firms, such as Companies A, B and C, 
have relocated to ITPL from other locations for this reason. This, along with the advanced 
technology made available at ITPL, has helped make the park the cynosure of all companies 
engaged chiefly in the non-manufacturing industries, that is, those placed in the higher end of the 
value chain.  
 
Theories, from the perspective of the firm, have argued that not only should the production 
process be viewed as a value chain (Kogut, 1985; Porter, 1986), but also, firms should identify 
comparative or location-specific advantages unique to each country/territory (Dunning, 1988), 
which will serve to complement the competitive advantage they enjoy as a result of being placed 
higher up in the value chain. Additionally, in the face of globalisation, the location-specific 
advantages need to be altered to suit the increasing spatial integration of complex and rapidly 
changing economic activities and to also consider the role of national and regional authorities in 
their influence over the extent and structure of localised centres of excellence (Dunning, 1997). 
Thus, a holistic approach must be adopted that takes into consideration firm-oriented competitive 
advantages as well as comparative advantages offered by regions. Synergistic efforts will occur 
when there exists a strategic fit between the competitive and comparative advantages. 
 
ITPL represents a modified version of the Porter-Kogut analytical framework, whereupon the park 
has witnessed the location of firms engaged in marketing and sales, and other services (viz, the 
primary activities), which were supported by other activities such as technological development 
and infrastructure within the park (viz, the secondary activities), sufficiently provided by the 
Singapore partner. A case in point is the rapid establishment of companies in the BPO industry, 
and the myriad of e-services, including telemarketing and customer sales services, by simply 
making utmost use of the telecommunication facilities that the park showcased, as substantiated 
by our case studies. Indeed, technological development has constantly taken place within the 
park, to accommodate entry of new firms, and expansion of existing ones. ITPL’s management 
and the governmental support it has garnered have proven to be the park’s unique selling 
proposition. As well, ITPL is well-endowed with location-specific advantages: a blend of 
technology and infrastructure on one hand, and competitive skilled labour on the other, to support 
high value-added processes.  
 
Set against this scenario, the aim of ITPL in providing the ideal blend of both competitive and 
comparative advantages remains unrealised. While it succeeds in providing the crucial links 
within the value-added chain that give client firms a competitive advantage, the problem arises on 
the flip side of the desired strategic fit – the host country’s ability to provide comparative 
advantages. In this aspect, India has succeeded only in making available the advantages of 
‘factors of production’. While ITPL does provide some components of comparative advantage 
which the host country does not, such as reliable infrastructure and political commitment from the 
Singapore government, this is not complemented by the infrastructure outside the park, where 
roads to supporting administration continue to be nearly non-existent. In fact, the excellent 
infrastructure within the park that the tenants extol is not the result of an Indian endeavour. Both 
economic and political advantages, which Singapore sought to make best use of, were initially 
present. The Indian and the Karnataka government aligned their objectives with those of its 
Singapore counterpart while establishing the park. However, as it happens with most 
government-run projects, the state government has not made further inroads into the project with 
its support, and instead, much was left in the hands of the private sector and the Singapore 
consortium. The state government has reduced its stake in the project to a mere 6 per cent. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Singapore’s overseas industrial township projects invariably managed to secure special privileges 
from the host authorities, many of which were unprecedented, and unique, to the case study 
parks. For instance, in India, the Singapore partners were granted licences to build and operate 
their own power and water treatment plants and telecommunication facilities, which were 
traditionally considered to be exclusive rights in the country. As such, the parks could leverage on 
their reputation of reliable infrastructural facilities to motivate companies to relocate to these 
areas where such facilities were an anomaly. Moreover, since local government officials were 
usually part of the management boards of the parks, once bureaucratic procedures such as 
investment approvals, construction activities, import/export permits and immigration matters 
became accelerated processes. The parks serve to attract investors with its formulaic one-stop 
service within a self-sufficient, self-contained environment which is unburdened by inefficient 
administration. Significantly, Singapore’s positive reputation with multinational corporations for its 
stable, corrupt-free investment environment lends credibility, such that it seems privileged to be 
located in the parks. For example, ITPL is being used by many tenants to establish their brand-
image, as there is prestige associated with being located in the Singapore-styled park7. 
 
The influence of synergistic inter-governmental relations and, where existing, through the links to 
influential ethnic business groups in the investment location who often rely on state patronage for 
their access to infrastructural development projects must also not be discounted. ITPL shares the 
characteristic of active government involvement, with the Indian counterparts being the Karnataka 
state government and the Tata Group, which, though private, is well connected with the 
authorities. The strategic alliances between Singapore’s government-linked companies, and its 
counterparts in the regional sites, were instrumental in mobilizing the resources to complete these 
                                                          
7
 This was a constant refrain throughout our on-site interviews in ITPL in December 2002. 
 
multi-million projects. Nonetheless, as most openly admitted, a whole gamut of problems has 
emerged even with the enormous tangible (and intangible) resources mobilized through the 
strategic partnerships.  
 
Heightened competition 
 
With the sprouting of numerous similar parks in the same vicinity which are able to compete 
aggressively on cost, Singapore’s overseas industrial parks are increasingly losing their allure. 
For ITPL, its success apparently hinges on the “Singapore-styled design and management” 
reputation, and its capacity to provide stable electricity is the only differentiating factor from the 
other IT parks like the Software Tech Park and Electronics City. The premium placed on ITPL’s 
formulaic ‘one-stop’ service and self-sufficient infrastructure is, however, called into question. The 
listed lease price is Rs50 (approximately US$1) per square foot, whereas the rate in other areas, 
and within Electronic City itself, just outside ITPL, is less than Rs15. Our on-site interviews with 
IPTL tenants alluded to the possibility that the park’s attractiveness may – in time - be eroded, as 
more IT parks and companies are established within the vicinity to capitalize on the area’s repute, 
while offering lower rentals with reliable energy, as the state develops. 
 
Political ‘Patronage’   
Reliance on political patronage (and personal ties) rather than transparent contracts has had 
advantages and disadvantages. In India, varying degrees of commitment and support by different 
state governments towards the country’s development can affect ITPL’s competitive advantage. 
The lack of good supporting infrastructure in the surrounding environment, and the disparity in 
local state-government supporting different cities, serve as a deterrent to investors, even as cities 
like Hyderabad, Mumbai and Chennai continue to advance technologically. On a broader front, 
corruption remains endemic, and bureaucratic red-tape is difficult to circumvent. These 
considerations are, by themselves, deterrence to potential investors, even with Singapore’s 
presence and involvement. To hedge Singapore’s strategic interests in India, Ascendas is 
partnering India’s largest construction conglomerate, Larsen and Toubro, to build Cyber Pearl in 
the third phase of Hyderabad’s Hitec City, while plans are in place to develop another IT park in 
Chennai. Singapore’s President S.R. Nathan recently reiterated this intention:  
 
“There has been a transformation in Bangalore, and we had 
gone into it well before others. The International Tech Park is a 
demonstration of our interest in developing infrastructure and 
making use of our planning and management expertise, which is 
now widely accepted.” 
(The Straits Times, January 6, 2003) 
Negotiations to develop similar IT parks in other Indian states, on a turnkey basis, have already 
started. 
 
The practical significance here is that Singapore’s overseas parks tend to exist as investment 
enclaves within a disjointed economic and policy environment. They are linked to transnational 
investment networks, business elites and specific government commitments. The positive aspect 
of this is that the parks can be sites of investment privilege, in respect of their regulatory controls, 
infrastructure quality and status with public and private agencies. The weakness is that the 
privileges obtained are vulnerable to changes in political allegiance and the infrastructure 
efficiency is at risk from the uncontrolled broader environment in which the park is located. This 
study has shown that the initial optimism with which the regionalization initiative was unveiled has 
not been justified, that development assumptions have proven to be misplaced, and that 
Singapore’s ‘vision’ - to create an environment for enterprise – has not been fully realized. The 
power of ideas, without cognizance of socio-political realities, has its limits. 
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